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PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
HOLISTIC SOCIAL POLICY
Thomas D. Watts
Graduate School of Social Work
The University of Texas at Arlington
ABSTRACT
The reliability of positivistic social science knowledge poses
seminal problems for social policy. Needed is more sound phenom-
enological and qualitative research within the conspectus of the
twin theoretical movements of ethnomethodology and the Frankfurt
School, towards the goal of a more holistic social science knowledge
base as well as a more holistic social policy.
The idea of a comprehensive social policy rests on an epis-
temological base. If we accept the definition given social policy
by Martin Rein, that social policy is the "planning for social ex-
ternalities, redistribution, and the equitable distribution of social
benefits, especially social services" with its subject matter being
"not the social services alone, but the social purposes and conse-
quences of agricultural, economic, manpower, fiscal, physical de-
velopment, and social welfare policies,"1 then we can say that
"social policy" and "social science" go hand in hand. Without know-
ledge social policy could not be formulated, not much less be
expressed.
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By knowledge I imply an obviously larger purvey than social
science knowledge. Philosophy, for example, is of considerable
import to social policy formulation, yet it is not a social science
per se. So are numerous other sciences, such as the natural and
physical sciences. Yet the knowledge core that feeds into social
policy comes largely from the social sciences, which purport to
explain social phenomena, and which are at the same time heavily
influenced by philosophy (for example, the current influence of
phenomenology on the social sciences).
This essay considers the problem of the reliability of social
science knowledge for social policy. It is the thesis of this
essay that the reliability of social science knowledge poses a
seminal problem for social policy formulation. The twin theoret-
ical movements of ethnomethodology and the Frankfurt School have
informed and guided my thinking in this area, and are stated
here somewhat explicitly since a correlative thesis of the essay
and of much social science thinking today is that the era of
"value free" social science is over. Following Alvin Gouldner,
values and ideology play inestimable roles throughout the epistem-
ological mosaic of any science.
The reliability of social science research and knowledge has
been increasingly called into question. Alvin Gouldner, in his
seminal work, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970), is
really addressing himself to the crisis of positivism in the social
sciences. It is held here that the key issue in the reliability
or nonreliability of social science for social policy rests in the
positivistic tenets and positivistic influences that have been the
inherited tradition of Western social science. "From the time of
Comte on, the reigning philosophical foundation of Western social
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science has been that of its founder, namely, positivism. The very
name 'positivism' denotes Comte's emphasis on the 'positive
sciences', that is, on exhaustively tested and 'objectivized' data
rather than on purely speculative neologisms."2
The essential principles of positivistic social science have
culminated in the following scientistic conceptions, as so well
stated by the Frankfurt School adherent Trent Shroyer:
(1) That knowledge is inherently neutral;
(2) That there is a unitary scientific method;
(3) That the standard of certainty and exactness in the
physical sciences is he caly explanatory model for
scientific knowledge.
3
Positivism harbors the notion that the research methodologies
and instrumentations of the natural and physical sciences can be
employed accurately and efficiently in examining the complexities
and intricacies of social or human phenomena. The positivistic
world-view is enthralled with the idea of complete quantification
of all social phenomena, with categorization, reification, numer-
ation. The "separate reality" of Castenada does not exist outside
a scientistic mind-set and empirical framework that makes up scien-
tific discourse. The positivistic scientist has replaced the med-
ieval priest, say some, as the supreme and ultimate arbiter and
authority on the shape and make-up of the universe.
Positivistic social science is more inclined to "reify"
official statistics or findings. The positivist is not so con-
cerned with the shaping of "official statistics" as he is with the
statistics themselves. The reliance on "factual" or statistical
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data is so great that the actor himself and how he came to be a
"statistic," or how other actors are, for some reason, not
"statistics" seem to the positivist as questions to be irrelevant
at best, and at worst "non-scientific" as they do not contain em-
pirical referents or measureable, recordable data. This "scien-
tific method which is undergoing questioning," assays Henry Maas,
"is one which tries too hard to objectify and fractionate for
analysis the human condition under study and often, prematurely,
to quantify its components or 'variables. ,,,4
Social policy must "rely" on social science knowledge and
research. A social policy based on erroneous and misleading
"official statistics" will finalize itself as an erroneously con-
ceived and implemented social policy. Like a virus, the positivis-
tic "official statistics" or "final results" of a study remain
around to haunt each and every tenet of the most "comprehensive"
of social policies. Wittgenstein once remarked that the frame of
his entire universe was the language he spoke. The frame of the
social policy universe is the social science information and know-
ledge base upon which it rests and from which it draws its ideas,
and very sustenance. Whether a social policy on delinquency based
on Cloward's "opportunity theory" will be an effective one will
be based to a great extent on the accuracy of the theory itself.
Even further, it will be effective if the research and statistics
upon which opportunity theory is based were valid in themselves
and whether and how Cloward took that into account in the formula-
tion of his theory.
Two emerging and enervative theoretical movements in social
science which together enunciate the most telling critiques of
-61-
positivism are Ethnomethodology and the Frankfurt School. Posi-
tivism poses such intricate dile-sas for social science and for
social policy that an investigation of these two movements would
appear fruitful.
Ethnomethodology is a major movement in sociological thought,
part of a larger school often referred to as "phenomenological
sociology." This year's annual meeting of the American Sociologi-
cal Association will harbor an entire section devoted to the area,
and the spate of journal articles and books influenced by the
movement grows steadily in volume. In the sind of this movement,
"positivistic science has ignored the world of everyday life, a
world composed of intersubjectivity, intentionalities, and varying
conscious levels.., the methods of the natural sciences are not
adequate models for the study of the social phenomena of everyday
life."' It is a movement that springs from Husserl, the philosoph-
ical founder of phenomenology. Husserl founded what is often
referred to as a "philosophy of the subjective," a philosophy that
took on the alleged "objectivism" of science and asked whether
intentionalities and consciousness were really ingredients in our
understanding of social scenes. Ethnomethodology states that even
reality itself is socially constructed. The classic explanative
for this stance is contained in Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann,
The Social Construction of Reality (1966). For Harold Garfinkel,
the founder of the "California School of Sociology" (as Ethnometh-
odology is often referred to, largely because so many of its adher-
ents are in California universities, and because it appears to fit
into a "hip" sociological blend), the social world is held together
not by an exalted and elaborate Parsonsian value and morality
structure, but by a complex, intricate, collective structure of
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so-called "tacit understandings" (what men know and know others
know) concerning the most ordinary and seemingly trivial of daily
affairs).
Ethnomethodology wishes to "go inside" the actor, to under-
stand social reality from the point of view of the person living
that social reality. Ethnomethodology, despite the term, is more
theory than method. It is a "phenomenology of the social world"
(to coin the title of the famous book by Alfred Schutz) employing
a method it calls "documentary interpretation." Here the ethnometh-
odological researcher takes the actions of the actors as an expres-
sion, a "document" of an underlying pattern, takes as problematic
all of the actor's behavior (and his own as researcher), pays con-
stand heed to how concepts are linked to observations and makes
public and observable all of his own documentary activities.
In this regard, ethnomethodology maintains that the social
order, with all its social symbols and Nriegated meanings, exists
precariously and has no existence at all independent of the actor's
accounting and describing practices. No more earth rattling de-
parture from traditional positivist dogmatisms in this respect
could have been uttered. For in ethnomethodological research
(which is not opposed to sophisticated measurement devices, but
only feels that they are often misleading, and pitifully inade-
quate for explaining social phenomena) there is the attempt to
uncover and detect the hidden background expectancies, the "norms-
in-use", the "etceteras" of the variegated social world. It goes
further than symbolic interactionism, in attempting to unravel
the background expectancies, the "etceteras" (that Garfinkel refers
to so often) that compose the intricate mosaic of the social world.
What relevance or impact can Ethnomethodology have for the
social science that social policy could employ, and indeed for
social policy itself? Perhaps the most comprehensive ethnometh-
odological research study is Aaron Cicourel's compelling four-
year study, The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (1968).
The impact that studies of this kind can have on social policy is
significant, especially because of the signal role played by the
actors in the study. In this study (which employed audiovisual
equipment and other means in a seemingly exhausting series of
"documentary interpretations") the activities of all the actors
in the Juvenile justice scenario are parlayed: p--ice, parents,
judge, probation officer, community. The conclusions of the study
(done in two San Francisco Bay area counties) are that descrip-
tions of juveniles and their crimes by police, probation officers
and other court officials are selectively put together so that
they will "fit" both the social machinery of juvenile justice and
the theoretical frames of reference of the participants in that
machinery. Cicourel calls into question most ordinary positivist
assumptions used to process information (that will be positivistic
information, of course) in social science. He goes through lengthy
interview protocols statement by statement, demonstrating that the
researcher must use the same co-n-sense rules of interpretation
laymen do in order to make sense of what people say.
This is research that takes labelling theory out into the
social arena, that in fact goes considerably beyond it. The value
for social policy lies in the "whole" of the picture spoken of
earlier. All of the actors are taken into the scene and documentar-
ized and interpreted. Cicourel, a sociologist at Berkeley at the
time, even became friends with several of the police and over a
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few beers at a nearby bar learned a great deal about police atti-
tudes on juveniles away from the formal work scene. Delinquency
is seen as a socially produced fact. Criminal statistics are
creatures of the day-to-day activities of law enforcement are are
fit subjects for investigation themselves. This is not research
that tells social policy exactly "what to do" (nor is any other
kind of social research) but it does provide knowledge that is
more "whole" than "partial" (again to coin Sartre), a whole and
comprehensive knowledge of a radical empiricist composition that
is so sorely needed in social policy formulation today. Research
that can be of value to social policy must go beyond positivist
or structural-functionalist edifices and must, as Husserl said,
to to the thing itself. The thing itself must be approached from
the point of view of "the thing itself." If social work can be
divided into clinical and community practice areas, then it could
be said that Ethnomethodology proffers a critique of positivism
that is a trifle more oriented to the former, while the Frankfurt
School thrusts its positivist critique more in the direction of
the latter.
The Frankfurt School, often referred to as "Critical Theory,"
lists as some of its more outstanding exponents Herbert Marcuse,
Jurgen Habermas, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, T. W. Adorno and
Albrecht Wellmer. The Frankfurt School proffers a neo-Marxist,
antipositivist and psychologically-influenced marriage of the in-
sights of Marx and Freud, Marxism and Existentialism. In the eyes
of the Frankfurt School there is a "hidden positivism" in Marx.
The basic historical result of the ambiguity in Marx's theory was
a mechanistic understanding of historical materialism. This theor-
etical misconception was translated into practice in two different
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ways: (1) in the West, the evolutionist views of communist
parties, and (2) in the East, it led to Lenin's technocratic con-
ception. 7 The Frankfurtians are interested in a genuinely radical
alternative to the mechanistic and positivistic elements in Harx.
For Marx technology was neutral, for the Frankfurtians technology
has become ideology. Contemporary science and technology have
become new forms of power and privilege. The positivism that
science and technology harbor as its professed philosophy of
science separates the subject and the object of knowledge and takes
the statements of science as an observational given. "Knowledge"
is thus conceived as a neutral picturing of fact.
Older Marxists spoke often of "false consciousness." The
exponents of Critical Theory affirm that the scientific image of
science is the fundamental false consciousness of our epoch.
Whereas Marx saw "production" in a 19th century fashion, the Frank-
furt School sees science and technology as constituting the decis-
ive force of production today. Hence, Herbert Marcuse sees the
university as the most important institutional locus of this new
force of production. The working class are not a vehicle of rad-
ical change because class conflict is no more than latent today.
Probably the most profound spokesman for the mvement today
has been Jurgen Habermas. Habermas has argued his case in two
seminal books, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971) and Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and
Politics (Boston: Beacon Press, 19U7). For Habermas, the revolu-
tions of the East have failed, the stabilization of capitalism in
the West is now an established reality (relatively speaking), and
revolution is impossible in either system. Self-reflection or
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critical reflection, themes that are antithetic to positivistic
empirical dogmatizing, in the mind of Habermas, is absent or nearly
so in the social science commnities and societies of both East
and West. As Gouldner has brought home so well in The Coming
Crisis of Western Sociology, Structural-Functionalist and Marxist
social scientists attend international conferences together, and
resemble each other in a rather striking way.
Melvyn A. Hill states that: "For Habermas, the development
of technical knowledge becomes the base of society, rather than
Marx's economics.. .science...replaces the means of production, as
the base of the dialectic of history. And consequently Habermas
turns to a critique of the philosophy of science, of positivism,
in order to pursue his unravelling of ideology in the development
of modern knowledge and society... The basis of positivism...is
the disavowel of reflection. The result of this has been the con-
viction that we no longer understand science as one form of pos-
sible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science."
8
Whenever positivism totally permeates a scientific establishment,
it functions as a kind of societal a priori that uncritically per-
mits the extension of an exploitatfv-einstrumental rationalization.
That is, it contributes to the generation of decision-making whose
"rationality" is instrumental effectiveness and efficiency.
The rivers, streams and environment of both the USSR and the
US are equally polluted. In the USSR, the all-powerful state
gears itself to "effectiveness" and "efficiency" (even if people
get in the way), while in the US capitalist industry occupies a
similar bailiwick. In the USSR individuals are "tracked" from the
earliest years to a blue-collar pursuit, or the rare and privileged
few to a university. Examinations are rigidly applied and adhered
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to as a sort of secular god speaking his consummate will on earth.
Numerical test results are "reified" into "Reality." In the US
the situation is only slightly better. No one can define what
"failure" is, certainly not in life, even less so in the school-
room. Yet it is built into the entire educational system as a
reified social construct, as a positivistic absolutism with no
recourse (some avenues out of this have been provided by William
Glasser in his Schools Without Failure and also in the concept of
"mastery learning").
Positivism in either country is more likely to elevate such
terms as "Fail," "Schizophrenic," "Delinquent," etc., reifying and
absolutizing them. One an easily see that a social policy based
on such frighteningly structured absolutisms will be a social
policy that is absolutistic and positivistic to its very core.
Critical Theory teaches social science and social policy to "be
critical." Without criticism and self-reflection, without intense
philosophizing on the very language employed in social science
discourse, on the social statistics employed and trumpeted as
"findings" and "results" or "reality" in social science, social
policy anchors itself on the quicksand of preconceived notions and
ill-acquired data masking as "facts."
The Frankfurt School also proffers a revivified and humanis-
tic socialism for our time, a critical theory of society that
attempts to immask repressive forces and oppressive institutions.
These oppressive institutions employ knowledge in their daily
activities. Peter Drucker has referred to a "knowledge society."
The Frankfurt School would agree with this estimation and would ask,
as Jurgen Habermas has stated so eloquently: "If we imagine the
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philosophical discussion of the modern period reconstructed as a
judicial hearing, it would be deciding a single question: How is
reliable knowledge possible?"
Social policy must perforce heighten its interest in that
fundamental Habermas question. I maintain that reasonably reliable
knowledge is possible in social policy formulation, but that that
knowledge can only be made possible after some major misconceptions
are swept away concerning what social reality is, how it is con-
structed and maintained, and the repressive role that positivistic
social science or social policy can play.
Perhaps no better example of the destructive effects of
positivistic social science on social policy can be found than in
ghetto schools. The famous Coleman Report of 1966 was a classic
example of positivistic research imposed on, and looked at from,
the "outside in." The feelings of black youth and parents never
saw the light of day in the weave of that rather sizeable research
effort.
A single qualitative research study on the feelings of black
youth toward the grade of "F" in their school lives may come much
closer to illuminating our minds about educational policy than ten
more quantitative studies on the grading systems of the public
school system. The reification of the concept of "failure" that
is the hallmark of the public school system can only initially be
"got at" through the attitudes and feelings of the diief actor in
the drama (the youth recipient of a poor or failing grade).
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Donald Schon has called for an existential knowing and learn-
ing process whereby knowledge is garnered from the "inside out,"
through such means as the case history, the narrative, and of
course through interaction itself. 9 If knowledge is to be gained
from the inside out, from the particular point of view of black
youth in a ghetto high school, then such qualitative methodologies
as participant observation, in-depth interviews with selected
samples, and the like must be employed. An ethnoethodological
study of high school dropouts on the scale of Aaron Cicourel's
major ethnomethodological study of "delinquents" in two probation
departments would be of imense benefit to educational policy-
makers.
The need for sound qualitative and phenomenological research
for educational policy-making (or for any other area of policy
formulation) does not diminish the importance or usefulness of
quantitative research. Jean Paul Sartre once remarked that social
problems are whole, not partial, and must be treated as such. The
knowledge &at is necessary for social policy and planning must
include both qualitative md quantitative elements in order that
it might take on a composition that is 'whole" rather than "partial."
Quantitative and qualitative research can co-exist in a harmonious
relationship that is attuned to knowledge-building in all its
dimensions. The social science knowledge that has been utilized
in social policy formulation in the past has been "partial" in that
it has had an almost totally quantitative composition, with infor-
mation gathered primarily from looking "outside in" rather than
"inside out." Donald Shon has warned that social welfare policy
can ill afford to depend on just one kind of knowing of the tradi-
tional positivist variety.1 0
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Above all, the social science that feeds into social policy
must be enervative and liberating. As Marx was liberating in the
century that followed him, so Husserl and Phenomenology can be in
the next. If social science researching can combine the two, then
assuredly we have before us a knowledge base that social policy
can employ fruitfully and meaningfully. For if the social science
that social policy relies on can be critical and emancipatory, then
we could surmise that the social policy forthcoming will have that
much greater opportunity of being truly critical, emancipatory and
liberative, for the benefit of all.
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